IRS as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints

@inproceedings{Andreoni1992IRSAL,
  title={IRS as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints},
  author={James Andreoni},
  year={1992}
}
Abstract This paper considers a simple dynamic model of tax compliance in which people may face binding borrowing constraints. The model leads to much different conclusions and policy recommendations than static models. In particular, the government cannot generate full compliance by setting the expected value of cheating to be negative. Also, it is possible for the government to set penalties in a way that will increase tax revenue over that of full compliance. The government can increase… CONTINUE READING
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