author={seguindo and Fumerton},
Our initial survey of the problems of induction and explanation is now complete. We have considered some of the forms these problems take, some of the reasons they are so difficult to solve, and some of the weaknesses in various attempts to solve them. In the last chapter, I also attempted something more constructive, by giving what I hope is an improved version of the causal model of explanation. Up to now, however, we have treated inference and explanation virtually in mutual isolation, a… 

Explanation as a Guide to Induction

Roger White In what circumstances should we draw an inductive inference? Gilbert Harman (1965) answered: When our conclusion provides the best explanation of our evidence. Despite the wide influence

Eliminative inferences and the problem of unconceived alternatives

The argument of the inference to the best explanation states that (i) because an evidence (E) needs explanation and (ii) because a hypothesis (H), based on true background knowledge, offered a better

Inference to the best explanation in the catch-22: how much autonomy for Mill’s method of difference?

In his seminal Inference to the Best Explanation, Peter Lipton adopted a causal view of explanation and a broadly Millian view of how causal knowledge is obtained. This made his account vulnerable to

Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic

  • M. Huemer
  • Philosophy
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 2009
The resulting synthesis of Bayesian and inference-to-best-explanation approaches affords a principled defense of prior probability distributions that support induction.

How General Do Theories of Explanation Have to Be?

Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN-account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court . Less

“Because” without “Cause”: The Uses and Limits of Non-Causal Explanation*

In this paper I deploy examples of non-causal explanations of physical phenomena as evidence against the view that causal models of explanation can fully account for explanatory practices in science.

A Little Survey of Induction

My purpose in this chapter is to survey some of the principal approaches to inductive inference in the philosophy of science literature. My first concern will be the general principles that underlie

Explanatory Inquiry and the Need for Explanation

Explanatory inquiry characteristically begins with a certain puzzlement about the world. But why do certain situations elicit our puzzlement (or curiosity) while others leave us, in some

Inference to the Best Theory, Rather than Inference to the Best Explanation — Kinds of Abduction and Induction

An interesting consequence of the theory of nomic truth approximation, as developed in my From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (Kuipers T, From instrumentalism to constructive realism. On

Bayesianism and inference to the best explanation

It is argued that Freq-Bay fits better than IBE-Bayesianism with two basic facts about science, i.e., the prominent role played by empirical testing and the existence of many scientific theories in the past that failed to fulfil their promises and were subsequently abandoned.



Inference to the Best Explanation PETER LIPTON

Science depends on judgments of the bearing of evidence on theory. Scientists must judge whether an observation or the result of an experiment supports, disconfirms, or is simply irrelevant to a

Putting inference to the best explanation in its place

It is argued that, on the two main conceptions of explanation, IBE cannot be a foundational inference rule, and an account of IBE is sketched that makes it contextual and dependent on substantive empirical assumptions, much as simplicity seems to be.

Simply the Best: A Case for Abduction

  • S. Psillos
  • Philosophy
    Computational Logic: Logic Programming and Beyond
  • 2002
The paper argues that abduction, suitably understood as Inference to the Best Explanation, offers the best description of scientific method and solves the foregoing problem in the best way: it strikes the best balance between ampliation and epistemic warrant.

Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle

It seems plausible to hold that if a person knows a given proposition, that person must also know any logical consequence of that proposition which he or she recognizes as such, and that knowledge is closed under known logical implication.

Inference to the loveliest explanation

  • E. Barnes
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • 2005
L'A. demontre que les arguments que P. Lipton developpe sur la base de sa these causale de la comprehension sont invalides et que les nombreux criteres qu'il fournit pour expliquer la beaute ne sont

“ Observations , Explanatory Power and Simplicity : Toward a Non - Humean Account ”

    Theoretical ( epistemic ) virtues ”

    • Crítica . Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia
    • 1988