IMPURE ALTRUISM AND DONATIONS TO PUBLIC GOODS: A THEORY OF WARM-GLOW GIVING*

@article{Andreoni1990IMPUREAA,
  title={IMPURE ALTRUISM AND DONATIONS TO PUBLIC GOODS: A THEORY OF WARM-GLOW GIVING*},
  author={James Andreoni},
  journal={The Economic Journal},
  year={1990},
  volume={100},
  pages={464-477}
}
  • J. Andreoni
  • Published 1 June 1990
  • Economics
  • The Economic Journal
When people make donations to privately provided public goods, such as charity, there may be many factors influencing their decision other than altruism. Social pressure, guilt, sympathy, or simply a desire for a "warm glow" may all be important. This paper considers such impure altruism formally and develops a wide set of implications. In particular, this paper discusses the invariance proposition of public goods, solves for the sufficient conditions for neutrality to hold, examines the… 

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