IMAGINABILITY, CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

@article{Hill1997IMAGINABILITYCP,
  title={IMAGINABILITY, CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM},
  author={Christopher S. Hill},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={1997},
  volume={87},
  pages={61-85}
}
L'A. defend le materialisme du type contre la ligne de pensee developpee par Kripke a partir de la manifestation de la douleur, dans son etat physique et dans son etat cerebral defini en termes de stimulation de la fibre-C. Examinant les notions de separabilite et imagination chez T. Nagel, et la faculte de concevoir le possible (desincarnation, zombie), l'A. montre que la position de Kripke ne met en question que l'ensemble des intuitions modales a posteriori qui se forment independamment de l… 
CONSCIOUSNESS, CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENTS, AND PERSPECTIVALISM: THE DIALECTICS OF THE DEBATE
Etude du debat conceptuel sur la conscience opposant les arguments anti-materialistes de la concevabilite a la reponse perspectiviste du materialisme. Examinant la dimension dialectique du debat a
Kripke's modal argument is challenged by his implausible conception of introspection
Kripke presented one of the most inuential modal arguments against psycho-physical identities. His argument as exemplied by the identity of pain and its respective neural correlates will be analysed
Physicalism and strict implication
TLDR
It is argued that Robert Kirk’s strict implication thesis is subject to the same objection that affects the notion of global supervenience, and reference to an idealised physics in the formulation of strict implication threatens to make the thesis vacuous.
POSSIBILITY AND IMAGINATION
In the argument’s more recent and general dress, what is said to be conceivable/imaginable is that “zombies” exist (see, e.g., Chalmers 1996: 94-9), but let us concentrate on Argument K. Descartes’
DOES NAGEL'S FOOTNOTE ELEVEN SOLVE THE MIND‐BODY PROBLEM?*
APPEARS CONTINGENT might be held to be true because it appears that the physical facts could be just as they are and no one feels anyway at all—that everyone is a zombie—or because it appears that
Why Can’t Armchair Philosophers Naturalize the Mind?
My topic is aposteriori naturalism, roughly the view that mental facts are determined by non-mental facts but philosophers cannot discover the details of the determination from the armchair. Section
Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge*
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of
Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities
TLDR
There’s a general case to be made for the existence of strong necessities outside the psychophysical domain, and given semantic assumptions that are essential to the conceivability argument, there is reason to believe in microphysical strong necessities.
Aboutness in imagination
  • F. Berto
  • Philosophy, Medicine
    Philosophical studies
  • 2018
TLDR
A formal theory of the logic and aboutness of imagination is presented, which combines a modal semantics with a mereology of contents: imagination operators are understood as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a content-preservation constraint.
A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to block's harder problem
Ned Block (2002) claims that there is “an epistemic tension” between two fairly widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that (a) we are
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-9 OF 9 REFERENCES
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility
Doubts about a maxim like Hume’s have a variety of historical sources. Some date back as far as Descartes’s claim that, since he can conceive himself in a purely mental condition, his essence is only
The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body
….it [is] wholly irrational to regard as doubtful matters that are perceived clearly and distinctly by the understanding in its purity, on account of mere prejudices of the senses and hypotheses in
Mental imagery and the visual system.
  • R. Finke
  • Psychology, Medicine
    Scientific American
  • 1986
Finke , “ Mental Imagery and the Visual System
  • The Scientific American
  • 1981
Of course, the interpretation of Shepherd's results is a matter of controversy. Not everyone would agree with the asessment offered above. For a quite different view, see Zenon Pylyshyn
  • The Imagery Debate: Analog Media Versus Tacit Knowledge
  • 1981
See also Kripke's "Identity and Necessity
  • Naming and Necessity
  • 1980
Kripke says that the model illustrated by the heat example is "the only model [he] can think of
  • Identity and Necessity
Oddly, the ideas in this footnote have not received any attention from the contemporary defenders of Kripke's argument, nor, as far as I know