I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self

@article{Benovsky2014IAA,
  title={I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self},
  author={Jiri Benovsky},
  journal={Metaphysica},
  year={2014},
  volume={15},
  pages={113 - 127}
}
Abstract When I say that I am a lot of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically speaking. The Self, or so I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that ordinary language takes “the Self” to be a singular term – but, after all, language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a collection or a bundle. The view I wish to advocate for is a kind of reductionism, in line with some – but not all – broadly Humean ideas. In short, I will defend the… Expand
Buddhist Philosophy and the No-Self View
A widespread interpretation of Buddhist thought concerning the self makes a prominent place for the claim that there is no self. This claim is motivated, in Buddhist philosophy, by the idea that ifExpand
The No-Self View and the Meaning of Life
Abstract:Several philosophers, both in Buddhist and Western philosophy, claim that the self does not exist. The no-self view may, at first glance, appear to be a reason to believe that life isExpand
Dual‐Aspect Monism
In this chapter, I defend dual-aspect monism, and I examine it in detail. I claim that an ‘aspect’ is not a property, nor a higher-order property, and I show what role it plays in the understandingExpand

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 57 REFERENCES
The self: a humean bundle and/or a cartesian substance?
is the self a substance, as Descartes thought, or is it ‘only’ a bundle of perceptions, as hume thought? in this paper i will examine these two views, especially with respect to two central featuresExpand
There are no ordinary things
Human experience, it may be said, naturally leads us to have a certain view of reality, which I call the view of common sense. This view is t empered by cultural advance, but in basic fo rm it isExpand
The self and the SESMET
I am most grateful to all those who commented on ‘“The Self”’. The result was a festival of misunderstanding, but misunderstanding is one of the great engines of progress. Few of the contributors toExpand
SELFHOOD AND THE FLOW OF EXPERIENCE
Analytic philosophy in the 20th century was largely hostile territory to the self as traditionally conceived, and this tradition has been continued in two recent works: Mark Johnston’s SurvivingExpand
The Principles of Psychology
I.TO give readers some idea of the contents of a good book is very often the most useful thing a reviewer can do. Unfortunately that course is not open to us in the present instance. The subject isExpand
From Experience to Metaphysics: On Experience-based Intuitions and their Role in Metaphysics
Metaphysical theories are often counter-intuitive. But they also often are strongly supported and motivated by intuitions. One way or another, the link between intuitions and metaphysics is a strongExpand
An Essay concerning Human Understanding
IT is possible to appreciate the reason for this abridged edition of Locke's great Essay and at the same time to regret its appearance. If it had to be done, no living philosopher is so qualified toExpand
Essays On The Intellectual Powers Of Man
This is Thomas Reid's greatest work. It covers far more philosophical ground than the earlier, more popular Inquiry. The Intellectual Powers and its companion volume, Essays on the Active Powers ofExpand
TIME IN EXPERIENCE: REPLY TO GALLAGHER
REPLY TO: Sync-ing in the Stream of Experience: Time-Consciousness in Broad, Husserl and Dainton, Psyche 9(10), April 2003 ABSTRACT: Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found withinExpand
What Are We
This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. AfterExpand
...
1
2
3
4
5
...