Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volition

  title={Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volition},
  author={Alexander A. Schlegel and Prescott Alexander and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Adina L. Roskies and Peter U. Tse and Thalia Wheatley},
  journal={Consciousness and Cognition},

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