Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis

  title={Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis},
  author={Esther Herrmann and Josep Call and Mª Victoria Hern{\'a}ndez-Lloreda and Brian A. Hare and Michael Tomasello},
  pages={1360 - 1366}
Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human… 
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