Human strategy updating in evolutionary games.

  title={Human strategy updating in evolutionary games.},
  author={Arne Traulsen and Dirk Semmann and Ralf D. Sommerfeld and Hans-J{\"u}rgen Krambeck and Manfred Milinski},
  journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America},
  volume={107 7},
Evolutionary game dynamics describe not only frequency-dependent genetic evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update rules can have a crucial impact on evolutionary dynamics in theoretical models and, for example, can significantly alter the level of cooperation in social dilemmas. What kind of strategy update rules can describe imitation dynamics in humans? Here, we present a… CONTINUE READING
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