Human cooperation: Second-order free-riding problem solved?

  title={Human cooperation: Second-order free-riding problem solved?},
  author={James H. Fowler},
  • J. Fowler
  • Published 22 September 2005
  • Engineering, Medicine
  • Nature
Arising from: K. Panchanathan & R. Boyd 432, 499–502 (2004); K. Panchanathan & R. Boyd replyPanchanathan and Boyd describe a model of indirect reciprocity in which mutual aid among cooperators can promote large-scale human cooperation without succumbing to a second-order free-riding problem (whereby individuals receive but do not give aid). However, the model does not include second-order free riders as one of the possible behavioural types. Here I present a simplified version of their model to… Expand

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