How to study folk intuitions about phenomenal consciousness1

  title={How to study folk intuitions about phenomenal consciousness1},
  author={Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  pages={21 - 35}
The assumption that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is pretheoretical is often found in the philosophical debates on consciousness. Unfortunately, this assumption has not received the kind of empirical attention that it deserves. We suspect that this is in part due to difficulties that arise in attempting to test folk intuitions about consciousness. In this article we elucidate and defend a key methodological principle for this work. We draw this principle out by considering recent… 
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