How to endorse conciliationism

@article{Fleisher2020HowTE,
  title={How to endorse conciliationism},
  author={Will Fleisher},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2020},
  pages={1-27}
}
  • Will Fleisher
  • Published 2020
  • Psychology
  • Synthese
  • I argue that recognizing a distinct doxastic attitude called endorsement , along with the epistemic norms governing it, solves the self-undermining problem for conciliationism about disagreement. I provide a novel account of how the self-undermining problem works by pointing out the auxiliary assumptions the objection relies on. These assumptions include commitment to certain epistemic principles linking belief in a theory to following prescriptions of that theory. I then argue that we have… CONTINUE READING
    1 Citations
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