How to Reconcile Physicalism and Antireductionism about Biology*

  title={How to Reconcile Physicalism and Antireductionism about Biology*},
  author={Alexander Rosenberg and David Michael Kaplan},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={43 - 68}
Physicalism and antireductionism are the ruling orthodoxy in the philosophy of biology. But these two theses are difficult to reconcile. Merely embracing an epistemic antireductionism will not suffice, as both reductionists and antireductionists accept that given our cognitive interests and limitations, non‐molecular explanations may not be improved, corrected or grounded in molecular ones. Moreover, antireductionists themselves view their claim as a metaphysical or ontological one about the… 

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