How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases”

@article{Gigerenzer1991HowTM,
  title={How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases”},
  author={Gerd Gigerenzer},
  journal={European Review of Social Psychology},
  year={1991},
  volume={2},
  pages={83-115}
}
  • G. Gigerenzer
  • Published 1991
  • Psychology
  • European Review of Social Psychology
Most so-called "errors" in probabilistic reasoning are in fact not violations of probability theory. Examples of such "errors" include overconfi dence bias, conjunction fallacy, and base-rate neglect. Research- ers have relied on a very narrow normative view, and have ignored conceptual distinctions—for example, single case versus relative frequency—fundamental to probability theory. By recognizing and using these distinctions, however, we can make apparently stable "errors" disappear, reappear… 

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