How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

  title={How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma},
  author={Jia Jia Wu and Robert Axelrod},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={183 - 189}
  • J. Wu, R. Axelrod
  • Published 1 March 1995
  • Economics
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
Noise in the form of random errors in implementing a choice is a common problem in real-world interactions. Recent research has identified three approaches to coping with noise: adding generosity to a reciprocating strategy; adding contrition to a reciprocating strategy; and using an entirely different strategy, Pavlov, based on the idea of switching choice whenever the previous payoff was low. Tournament studies, ecological simulation, and theoretical analysis demonstrate (1) a generous… 

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