How something can be said about telling more than we can know: On choice blindness and introspection

  title={How something can be said about telling more than we can know: On choice blindness and introspection},
  author={Petter Johansson and Lars Hall and Sverker Sikstr{\"o}m and Betty T{\"a}rning and Andreas Gonçalves Lind},
  journal={Consciousness and Cognition},
The legacy of Nisbett and Wilson's classic article, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes (1977), is mixed. It is perhaps the most cited article in the recent history of consciousness studies, yet no empirical research program currently exists that continues the work presented in the article. To remedy this, we have introduced an experimental paradigm we call choice blindness [Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. (2005). Failure to detect mismatches… 
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  • T. Froese
  • Medicine, Psychology
    Consciousness and Cognition
  • 2013
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