• Corpus ID: 5159670

How many times do we need and assumption ?

@article{Haeusler2014HowMT,
  title={How many times do we need and assumption ?},
  author={Edward Hermann Haeusler},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2014},
  volume={abs/1405.0541}
}
In this article we present a class of formulas Fn, n in Nat, that need at least 2^n assumptions to be proved in a normal proof in Natural Deduction for purely implicational minimal propositional logic. In purely implicational classical propositional logic, with Peirce's rule, each Fn is proved with only one assumption in Natural Deduction in a normal proof. Hence, the formulas Fn have exponentially sized proofs in cut-free Sequent Calculus and Tableaux. In fact 2^n is the lower-bound for normal… 

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