How many concepts of consciousness?

  title={How many concepts of consciousness?},
  author={Ned Block},
  journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  pages={272 - 287}
  • N. Block
  • Published 1 June 1995
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Abstract With some help from the commentators, a few adjustments to the characterizations of A-consciousness and P-consciousness can avoid some trivial cases of one without the other. But it still seems that the case for the existence of P without A is stronger than that for A without P. If indeed there can be P without A, but not A without P, this would be a remarkable result that would need explanation. 
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