How does the brain encode epistemic reliability? Perceptual presence, phenomenal transparency, and counterfactual richness.

@article{Metzinger2014HowDT,
  title={How does the brain encode epistemic reliability? Perceptual presence, phenomenal transparency, and counterfactual richness.},
  author={Thomas K. Metzinger},
  journal={Cognitive neuroscience},
  year={2014},
  volume={5 2},
  pages={122-4}
}
Seth develops a convincing and detailed internalist alternative to the sensorimotor-contingency theory of perceptual phenomenology. However, there are remaining conceptual problems due to a semantic ambiguity in the notion of "presence" and the idea of "subjective veridicality." The current model should be integrated with the earlier idea that experiential "realness" and "mind-independence" are determined by the unavailability of earlier processing stages to attention. Counterfactual richness… CONTINUE READING

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