How agency conflict between family managers and family owners affects performance in wholly family-owned firms: A generational perspective

@inproceedings{BlancoMazagatos2016HowAC,
  title={How agency conflict between family managers and family owners affects performance in wholly family-owned firms: A generational perspective},
  author={Virginia Blanco-Mazagatos and Esther de Quevedo-Puente and Juan Bautista Delgado-Garc{\'i}a},
  year={2016}
}
This study analyses the effects of agency conflict between “active family owners” (who participate in firm management) and “passive family owners” (who do not do so) on the performance in unlisted Spanish family firms wholly owned by family members. We employ agency theory to argue that ownership concentration by active family owners and governance mechanisms (direct control by passive family owners, existence of board of directors, and family governance mechanisms) improve the firm performance… CONTINUE READING