Corpus ID: 218540172

How Electoral Institutions Shape the Efficiency and Equity of Distributive Policy

@inproceedings{Hankinson2019HowEI,
  title={How Electoral Institutions Shape the Efficiency and Equity of Distributive Policy},
  author={Michael Hankinson and A. Magazinnik},
  year={2019}
}

• Michael Hankinson, A. Magazinnik
• Published 2019

How does the aggregation of voters affect the trade-off between the efficient production of collective goods and the equitable distribution of costs? We find that district elections amplify the local interests of previously underrepresented groups, but also threaten the collective provision of goods with concentrated costs and diffuse benefits. To do so, we leverage the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 as a conditionally exogenous institutional reform, compelling over one hundred cities in… Expand