How Do We Obtain Understanding with the Help of Explanations?

@article{Trziu2020HowDW,
  title={How Do We Obtain Understanding with the Help of Explanations?},
  author={Gabriel T{\^a}rziu},
  journal={Axiomathes},
  year={2020},
  pages={1-25}
}
What exactly do we need in order to enjoy the cognitive benefit that is supposed to be provided by an explanation? Some philosophers (most notably Khalifa in Philos Sci 79(1):15–37, 2012, Episteme 10(1):1–17, 2013, Eur J Philos Sci 5(3):377–385, 2015, Understanding, explanation, and scientific knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) would say that all that we need is to know the explanation. Others (e.g. Newman in Int Stud Philos Sci 26(1):1–26, 2012; Strevens in Stud Hist… 

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