How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value ? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

@inproceedings{Cohen2013HowDS,
  title={How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value ? Evidence from a Natural Experiment},
  author={A. Cohen},
  year={2013}
}
  • A. Cohen
  • Published 2013
  • The well-established negative correlation between staggered boards (SBs) and firm value could be due to SBs leading to lower value or a reflection of low-value firms’ greater propensity to maintain SBs. We analyze the causal question using a natural experiment involving two Delaware court rulings–separated by several weeks and going in opposite directions–that affected the antitakeover force of SBs. We contribute to the long-standing debate on staggered boards by documenting empirical evidence… CONTINUE READING
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