Corpus ID: 630106

How Do Family Ownership , Management , and Control Affect Firm Value ?

  title={How Do Family Ownership , Management , and Control Affect Firm Value ?},
  author={Belen Villalongaa and Raphael Amitb},
Using proxy data on all Fortune 500 firms during 1994-2000, we establish that, in order to understand whether and when family firms are more or less valuable than nonfamily firms, one must distinguish among three fundamental elements in the definition of family firms: ownership, control, and management. Specifically, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as the CEO of the family firm or as its Chairman with a hired CEO. Control mechanisms including dual share… Expand
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