How Dictatorships Work

  title={How Dictatorships Work},
  author={Barbara Geddes and Joseph G Wright and Erica Frantz},
Dictators, personalized security forces, and coups
  • Wonjun Song
  • Political Science
    International Interactions
  • 2022
ABSTRACT Dictators rely on coercive forces to remain in office, as violence is the ultimate arbiter of power in these regimes. However, coercive forces also can remove the dictator from office in a
Power Sharing and Media Freedom in Dictatorships
ABSTRACT This article investigates the relationship between elite power sharing and media freedom in dictatorships. While conventional wisdom posits that dictators have a strong incentive to control
Previous Military Rule and Democratic Survival
Existing scholarship shows that a history of military rule increases the risk of democratic breakdown. However, scholars overlook the fact that military rule takes two distinct forms: collegial and
Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability
abstract:This article explores the causes of authoritarian durability. Why do some authoritarian regimes survive for decades, often despite severe crises, while others collapse quickly, even absent
Plebiscites: a tool for dictatorship
Abstract The comparative study of authoritarianism has neglected plebiscites, and the comparative study of referendums tends to see in them a form of direct democracy regardless of the regime. We
Political Budgetary Cycles in Autocratic Redistribution
  • Kangwook Han
  • Political Science, Economics
    Comparative Political Studies
  • 2021
While political budgetary cycles in democracies have been rigorously studied for the past several decades, surprisingly little is known about electorally motivated policy manipulation in
The Autocratic Ruling Parties Dataset: Origins, Durability, and Death
How do autocratic ruling parties gain power? What predicts their durability and how they fall? This article introduces the Autocratic Ruling Parties Dataset, the first comprehensive data set on the
Trading privileges for support: the strategic co-optation of emerging powers into international institutions
Abstract As emerging powers rise and established powers decline, international institutions come under pressure to adjust to new power realities. When and how do international institutions adapt to
Reshaping the Threat Environment: Personalism, Coups, and Assassinations
Dictators shape regime structures to counter the threats they face. Personalization entails the progressive accumulation of power in the hands of the dictator to minimize internal threats from
The latent characteristics that structure autocratic rule
Abstract Research on autocratic regimes in comparative politics and international relations often uses categorical typologies of autocratic regimes to distinguish among different forms of autocracy.