How Could Trade Affect Conflict?

  title={How Could Trade Affect Conflict?},
  author={James D. Morrow},
  journal={Journal of Peace Research},
  pages={481 - 489}
  • J. D. Morrow
  • Published 1 July 1999
  • Economics
  • Journal of Peace Research
A common argument is that international trade prevents conflict because the possible loss of trade reduces the willingness of both sides to fight. I examine the logic of this argument in the light of game theoretic models of conflict. In such models, crises are contests of relative resolve. Neither side, however, can observe the other side's resolve in totality; resolve has observable and unobservable components. Instead both sides try to judge the other's unobservable resolve from their… 
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