How Clients Select Brokers: Competition and Choice in India's Slums

  title={How Clients Select Brokers: Competition and Choice in India's Slums},
  author={Adam Michael Auerbach and Tariq Thachil},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={775 - 791}
Conventional models of clientelism often assume poor voters have little or no choice over which local broker to turn to for help. Yet communities in many clientelistic settings are marked by multiple brokers who compete for a following. Such competition makes client choices, and the preferences guiding such choices, pivotal in fueling broker support. We examine client preferences for a pervasive broker—slum leaders—in the context of urban India. To identify resident preferences for slum leaders… 
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