How Basic Are Behavioral Biases? Evidence from Capuchin Monkey Trading Behavior

  title={How Basic Are Behavioral Biases? Evidence from Capuchin Monkey Trading Behavior},
  author={M. Keith Chen and Venkat R. Lakshminarayanan and Laurie R Santos},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  pages={517 - 537}
Behavioral economics has demonstrated systematic decision‐making biases in both lab and field data. Do these biases extend across contexts, cultures, or even species? We investigate this question by introducing fiat currency and trade to a colony of capuchin monkeys and recovering their preferences over a range of goods and gambles. We show that capuchins react rationally to both price and wealth shocks but display several hallmark biases when faced with gambles, including reference dependence… 

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