Corpus ID: 37545433

How Autocrats Defend Themselves Against Armed Rivals

@inproceedings{Geddes2009HowAD,
  title={How Autocrats Defend Themselves Against Armed Rivals},
  author={B. Geddes},
  year={2009}
}
In this paper I investigate the survival strategies of dictators whose tenure in office depends on armed supporters. The main threat that faces such leaders is ouster by military coup. I argue that dictators’ strategy choices for responding to that threat depend on characteristics of the military force from which these rivals are likely to come. Where the military is professionalized, commanders can make credible promises to support a dictator who shares power with the rest of the officer corps… Expand
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