Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable

@inproceedings{Vermeulen2014HouseholdCW,
  title={Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable},
  author={Laurens Cherchye Thomas Demuynck Bram De Rock Frederic Vermeulen},
  year={2014}
}
  • Laurens Cherchye Thomas Demuynck Bram De Rock Frederic Vermeulen
  • Published 2014
Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption patterns. We start by defining a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable. In particular, stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We show that this revealed preference characterization generates testable conditions… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 60 references

“A Theory of Marriage: Part I”

G. Becker
Journal of Political Economy, • 1973
View 5 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

“The measurement of child costs: A Rothbarth-type method consistent with scale economies and parents’bargaining”

O. Bargain, O. Donni
European Economic Review, • 2012
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

“Collective labor supply: heterogeneity and nonparticipation”

R. Blundell, P.-A. Chiappori, T. Magnac
Meghir • 2007
View 5 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

“The assignment game I: the core”

L. S. Shapley, M. Shubik
International Journal of Game Theory, • 1972
View 2 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

“The construction of utility functions from expenditure data”

S. Afriat
International Economic Review, • 1967
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

“Assortative matching and search with labor supply and home production”, CeMMAP working paper CWP07/13

N. Jacquemet, J.-M
2013

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…