Holism, conceptual role, and conceptual similarity

  title={Holism, conceptual role, and conceptual similarity},
  author={Joey Pollock},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  pages={396 - 420}
  • Joey Pollock
  • Published 27 February 2020
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • Philosophical Psychology
ABSTRACT Holistic views of content claim that we each speak and think in distinct and idiosyncratic idiolects: although we may often entertain thoughts with similar contents, the content of our thoughts can never be type-identical. Many authors find this feature of holism problematic. Denying that two subjects can share thought content seems to lead to difficulties when it comes to providing accounts of various intersubjective phenomena, such as communication and disagreement. A common holist… 
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