History as a coordination device

@article{Argenziano2012HistoryAA,
  title={History as a coordination device},
  author={Rossella Argenziano and I. Gilboa},
  journal={Theory and Decision},
  year={2012},
  volume={73},
  pages={501-512}
}
Coordination games often have multiple equilibria. The selection of equilibrium raises the question of belief formation: how do players generate beliefs about the behavior of other players? This article takes the view that the answer lies in history, that is, in the outcomes of similar coordination games played in the past, possibly by other players. We analyze a simple model in which a large population plays a game that exhibits strategic complementarities. We assume a dynamic process that… Expand
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