History , Expectations , and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms

@inproceedings{Jackson2011HistoryE,
  title={History , Expectations , and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms},
  author={Matthew O. Jackson},
  year={2011}
}
We study the evolution of a social norm of “cooperation” in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behaviour that are stable in part due to agents’ interpretations of private information about the past, influenced by occasional commonly observed past behaviours. For sufficiently backward-looking societies, history completely drives equilibrium play… CONTINUE READING
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