• DOI:10.1007/S10670-011-9338-3
• Corpus ID: 142375514

Historical Epistemology or History of Epistemology? The Case of the Relation Between Perception and Judgment

@article{Sturm2011HistoricalEO,
  title={Historical Epistemology or History of Epistemology? The Case of the Relation Between Perception and Judgment},
  author={Thomas Sturm},
  journal={Erkenntnis},
  year={2011},
  volume={75},
  pages={303-324}
}

• T. Sturm
• Published 1 November 2011
• Philosophy
• Erkenntnis

This essay aims to sharpen debates on the pros and cons of historical epistemology, which is now understood as a novel approach to the study of knowledge, by comparing it with the history of epistemology as traditionally pursued by philosophers. The many versions of both approaches are not always easily discernable. Yet, a reasoned comparison of certain versions can and should be made. In the first section of this article, I argue that the most interesting difference involves neither the subject matter nor goal, but the methods used by the two approaches. In the second section, I ask which of the two approaches or methods is more promising given that both historical epistemologists and historians of epistemology claim to contribute to epistemology simpliciter. Using traditional problems concerning the epistemic role of perception, I argue that the historical epistemologies of Wartofsky and Daston and Galison fail to show that studying practices of perception is philosophically significant. Standard methods from the history of epistemology are more promising, as I show by means of reconstructing arguments in a debate about the relation between perception and judgment in psychological research on the famous moon illusion.