Higher pay, worse outcomes? The impact of mayoral wages on local government quality in Peru

@article{Pique2019HigherPW,
  title={Higher pay, worse outcomes? The impact of mayoral wages on local government quality in Peru},
  author={Ricardo Pique},
  journal={Journal of Public Economics},
  year={2019}
}
  • Ricardo Pique
  • Published 1 May 2019
  • Political Science, Economics
  • Journal of Public Economics

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