High-Frequency Trading on Decentralized On-Chain Exchanges

@article{Zhou2021HighFrequencyTO,
  title={High-Frequency Trading on Decentralized On-Chain Exchanges},
  author={Liyi Zhou and Kaihua Qin and Christof Ferreira Torres and Duc Viet Le and Arthur Gervais},
  journal={2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)},
  year={2021},
  pages={428-445}
}
Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) allow parties to participate in financial markets while retaining full custody of their funds. However, the transparency of blockchain-based DEX in combination with the latency for transactions to be processed, makes market-manipulation feasible. For instance, adversaries could perform front-running — the practice of exploiting (typically non-public) information that may change the price of an asset for financial gain.In this work we formalize, analytically… 

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