Hierarchical constrained egalitarianism in TU-games

@article{Koster2002HierarchicalCE,
  title={Hierarchical constrained egalitarianism in TU-games},
  author={Maurice Koster},
  journal={Mathematical Social Sciences},
  year={2002},
  volume={43},
  pages={251-265}
}
Abstract The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray [Econometrica 57 (1989) 615] for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of hierarchical systems . This hierarchical constrained egalitarian solution for TU-games is based on the hierarchical Lorenz-ordering as an inequality measure, that extends the weighted Lorenz-ordering of Ebert [Social Choice of Welfare 16 (1999) 233]. It is shown that the hierarchical constrained egalitarian solution consists of one… CONTINUE READING
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