• Corpus ID: 168170158

Heuristics in Multi-Winner Approval Voting

  title={Heuristics in Multi-Winner Approval Voting},
  author={Jaelle Scheuerman and Jason L. Harman and Nicholas Mattei and Kristen Brent Venable},
In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting. Moreover, scenarios such as committee or board elections require voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent may vote for as many candidates as they wish. Winners are chosen by tallying up the votes and choosing the top-$k$ candidates receiving the most votes. An agent may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their true… 

Modeling Voters in Multi-Winner Approval Voting

A novel model is proposed that takes into account the size of the winning set and human cognitive constraints; and it is demonstrated that this model is more effective at capturing real-world behaviors in multi-winner approval voting scenarios.

Heuristic Strategies in Uncertain Approval Voting Environments

The effectiveness of heuristics in single winner and multi-winner approval voting scenarios with missing votes is examined and it is shown that people vote truthfully in some situations and prioritize high utility candidates in others.



Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting

The computational complexity of computing a best response for both a single agent and a group of agents is examined, showing that it is NP-hard for an agent or agents to compute how to vote given a fixed set of approval ballots of the other agents.

Strategic Voting

  • R. Meir
  • Economics
    IEEE Intell. Informatics Bull.
  • 2017
The starting point will be the seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, which states that under a set of natural requirements, one cannot hope to construct a voting rule that is immune to strategic manipulations by the voters.

A Study of Human Behavior in Online Voting

A comprehensive study of people's voting behaviour in various online settings under the Plurality rule has insight for multi-agent system designers in uncovering patterns that provide reasonable predictions of voters' behaviors, which may facilitate the design of agents that support people or act autonomously in voting systems.

Information and strategic voting

The results show that information serves as a coordination device where strategic voting does not harm the plurality-preferred candidate’s chances of winning.

Empirical Evaluation of Voting Rules with Strictly Ordered Preference Data

A high consensus among the different voting rules;almost no instances of Condorcet's Paradox; almost no support for restricted preference profiles, and very little support for many of the statistical models currently used to generate election data for testing are found.

Voter response to iterated poll information

Under which circumstances sharing information via opinion polls can improve the quality of election outcomes and under which circumstances it may have negative effects, due to the increased opportunities for manipulation it provides are clarified.

Sophisticated approval voting, ignorance priors, and plurality heuristics: a behavioral social choice analysis in a Thurstonian framework.

Even though Thurstonian models do not force such agreement, the results show that the sincere social orders by Condorcet, Borda, plurality, and approval voting are identical in all 7 elections and in the Internet experiment.

An Empirical Study of Voting Rules and Manipulation with Large Datasets

The study of voting systems often takes place in the theoretical domain due to a lack of large samples of sincere, strictly ordered voting data. We derive several million elections (more than all the

How to Form Winning Coalitions in Mixed Human-Computer Settings

It is shown that solution concepts from cooperative game theory (in particular, an extension of the Deegan-Packel Index) provide a good prediction of people’s decisions to join coalitions in an online version of a weighted voting game.

On the Complexity of Voting Manipulation under Randomized Tie-Breaking

It is shown that finding an optimal vote under randomized tie-breaking is computationally hard for Copeland and Maximin (with general utilities), as well as for STV and Ranked Pairs, but easy for the Bucklin rule and Plurality with Runoff.