Heuristics and Biases: Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability

@inproceedings{Tversky2002HeuristicsAB,
  title={Heuristics and Biases: Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability},
  author={Amos Tversky and Derek J. Koehler},
  year={2002}
}
This article presents a new theory of subjective probability according to which different descriptions of the same event can give rise to different judgments. The experimental evidence confirms the major predictions of the theory. First, judged probability increases by unpacking the focal hypothesis and decreases by unpacking the alternative hypothesis. Second, judged probabilities are complementary in the binary case and subadditive in the general case, contrary to both classical and… 

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