Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action

@article{Ahn2003HeterogeneousPA,
  title={Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action},
  author={T. K. Ahn and E. Ostrom and James M. Walker},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={2003},
  volume={117},
  pages={295-314}
}
In recent years, scholarshave turned to alternative representationsof utility to capture motivationalheterogeneity across individuals. In theresearch reported here, we examine twomodels of heterogeneous utility –linear-altruism and inequity-aversion – inthe context of two-person, social dilemmagames. Empirical tests are conducteddrawing on data from experiments andsurveys. We find that the model ofinequity-aversion accounts for asubstantial proportion of the preferencetypes and behavior that… 

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Preface 1. Introduction: the problem of collective action 2. The prisoners' dilemma, chicken and other games in the provision of public goods 3. The two-person prisoners' dilemma supergame 4. The