Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting

  title={Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting},
  author={Gregor Matvos and M. Ostrovsky},
  journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
  • Gregor Matvos, M. Ostrovsky
  • Published 2010
  • Economics
  • Journal of Financial Economics
  • This paper studies voting in corporate director elections. We construct a comprehensive data set of 2,058,788 mutual fund votes over a two-year period. We find systematic heterogeneity in voting: some funds are consistently more management-friendly than others. We also establish the presence of peer effects: a fund is more likely to oppose management when other funds are more likely to oppose it, all else being equal. We estimate a voting model whose supermodular structure allows us to compute… CONTINUE READING
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