Health Insurance for "Humans": Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare

@article{Handel2015HealthIF,
  title={Health Insurance for "Humans": Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare},
  author={Benjamin R. Handel and Jonathan T. Kolstad},
  journal={HEN: Insurance (Topic)},
  year={2015}
}
Traditional models of insurance choice are predicated on fully informed and rational consumers protecting themselves from exposure to financial risk. In practice, choosing an insurance plan is a complicated decision often made without full information. In this paper we combine new administrative data on health plan choices and claims with unique survey data on consumer information to identify risk preferences, information frictions, and hassle costs. Our additional friction measures are… Expand

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