Handicap signalling: when fecundity and viability do not add up

@article{Getty1998HandicapSW,
  title={Handicap signalling: when fecundity and viability do not add up},
  author={Thomas Getty},
  journal={Animal Behaviour},
  year={1998},
  volume={56},
  pages={127-130}
}
  • T. Getty
  • Published 1 July 1998
  • Environmental Science
  • Animal Behaviour
It is widely accepted that a requirement for honest handicap signalling is that higher-quality signallers pay lower marginal costs for advertising. This is a simple, powerful principle, but it is correct only if the fitness effects of fecundity and viability are strictly additive. Additivity would not be expected from most life history models. The general criterion for honest handicap signalling is that higher-quality signallers must have higher marginal fitness effects of advertising. This… 

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