Hadza Cooperation

  title={Hadza Cooperation},
  author={Frank W. Marlowe},
  journal={Human Nature},
  • F. Marlowe
  • Published 1 December 2009
  • Psychology
  • Human Nature
Strong reciprocity is an effective way to promote cooperation. This is especially true when one not only cooperates with cooperators and defects on defectors (second-party punishment) but even punishes those who defect on others (third-party, “altruistic” punishment). Some suggest we humans have a taste for such altruistic punishment and that this was important in the evolution of human cooperation. To assess this we need to look across a wide range of cultures. As part of a cross-cultural… 

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The hypothesis that population size (and complexity) predicts the level of third-party punishment is tested and shows that people in larger, more complex societies engage in significantly more third- party punishment than people in small-scale societies.

The ‘spiteful’ origins of human cooperation

It is argued that ‘spiteful’ 2PP, motivated by the basic emotion of anger, is more universal than 3PP and sufficient to explain the origins of human cooperation.

Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms

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Altruistic punishment in humans

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The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment

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Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem

It is shown that the threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory, and that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem.

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Costly Punishment Across Human Societies

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