Hacking on the Looping Effects of Psychiatric Classifications: What Is an Interactive and Indifferent Kind?

  title={Hacking on the Looping Effects of Psychiatric Classifications: What Is an Interactive and Indifferent Kind?},
  author={Jonathan Y. Tsou},
  journal={International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
  pages={329 - 344}
  • Jonathan Y. Tsou
  • Published 1 October 2007
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
This paper examines Ian Hacking’s analysis of the looping effects of psychiatric classifications, focusing on his recent account of interactive and indifferent kinds. After explicating Hacking’s distinction between ‘interactive kinds’ (human kinds) and ‘indifferent kinds’ (natural kinds), I argue that Hacking cannot claim that there are ‘interactive and indifferent kinds,’ given the way that he introduces the interactive‐indifferent distinction. Hacking is also ambiguous on whether his notion… 

Kinds behaving badly: intentional action and interactive kinds

It is argued that the fact that classification facilitates intentional action makes human interactive kinds ontologically distinctive because of the anomalous nature of the change which the kind-classification brings about.

Interactive classifications: the case of Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in children

The conversion of undesirable behaviors into symptoms, which underlies the identification of ADHD as a disease, is discussed, and a more genera l model about the interaction between classifications and classified people is proposed.

A Note on the Dynamics of Psychiatric Classification

The question of how psychiatric classifications are made up and to what they refer has attracted the attention of philosophers in recent years. In this paper, I review the claims of authors who

Philosophy of Psychiatry

Jonathan Y. Tsou contends that the broader ideal of biological kinds offers a more promising and empirically ascertainable naturalistic standard for assessing the reality of mental disorders and the validity of psychiatric categories.

Natural kinds of mental disorder

A qualified defence for the view that there may be natural kinds of mental disorder, but also that the implications of this claim are generally overestimated.

From psychiatric kinds to harmful symptoms

  • C. Gauld
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • 2022
This article identifies and deconstruct two postulates that have held sway in the philosophy of psychiatry and proposes a practical definition of a psychiatric disorder that is useful for the clinician, while adopting a principle of prudential conservatism that does not exclude other theoretical definitions of psychiatric disorders that are useful as an epistemic hub.

What Is Constructionism in Psychiatry? From Social Causes to Psychiatric Classification

It will be argued that the alleged dependence of facts about particular mental disorders and about the second order property of being a mental disorder on social facts amounts to a robust form of constructivism, whereas the view that clinician–patient interaction is influenced by cultural facts is perfectly compatible with an anti-constructivist stance.

What Is Constructionism in Psychiatry? From Social Causes to Psychiatric Classification.

It is common to note that social environment and cultural formation shape mental disorders. The details of this claim are, however, not well understood. The paper takes a look at the claim that

Natural kinds, psychiatric classification and the history of the DSM

It is suggested that the DSM should classify natural kinds in order to provide predictively useful (i.e. projectable) diagnostic categories and that a causal approach to classification would provide a more promising method for formulating valid diagnostic categories.

Risky and at-risk subjects: The discursive positioning of the ADHD child in the Italian context

Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is the most common diagnosis given to children. In recent decades, there has been an increase in the diagnosis of ADHD and in methylphenidate use. This



Why Hacking is Wrong about Human Kinds

  • R. Cooper
  • Philosophy
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 2004
‘Human kind’ is a term introduced by Ian Hacking to refer to the kinds of people—child abusers, pregnant teenagers, the unemployed—studied by the human sciences. Hacking argues that classifying and

Psychiatric Disorders Are Not Natural Kinds

I critique the essentialistic notion that psychiatric disorders should be conceptualized as natural kinds, that is, exhaustively defined with reference to inherent properties. Biomedical model

Kinds of Kinds: A Conceptual Taxonomy of Psychiatric Categories

A pluralistic view of psychiatric classification is defended, according to which psychiatric categories take a variety of structural forms. An ordered taxonomy of these forms—non-kinds, practical

Kinds of People: Moving Targets

I HAVE LONG BEEN INTERESTED in classifications of people, in how they affect the people classified, and how the effects on the people in turn change the classifications. Since 1983 that has led me to

Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory

Some years ago, one could list by name the tiny number of multiple personalities recorded in the history of Western medicine, but today hundreds of people receive treatment for dissociative disorders

Hacking’s Reconciliation

In a series of recent works, Ian Hacking has produced a model of social causation in mental illness and begun to sketch in outline how this might be integrated with the medical model of psychiatry.

Psychiatry in the Scientific Image

In Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, Dominic Murphy looks at psychiatry from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy of science, considering three issues: how we should conceive of, classify, and

The Role of the Mentally Ill and the Dynamics of Mental Disorder: A Research Framework *

Drawing upon earlier formulations, this paper further develops an explicitly sociological theory of the causation and course of stable mental disorder. Central to this theory are nine propositions

Sociology and Hacking's Trousers

  • W. Schmaus
  • Sociology, Philosophy
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
  • 1992
For Hacking, the word "real", like the sexist expression "wear the trousers", takes its meaning from its negative uses. In this essay, I criticize Hacking's reasons for believing that the objects of

The Meaning of Meaning

The world is too complex to manage without radical functional simplification. Meaning appears to exist as the basis for such simplification. The meaning that guides functional simplification may be