HaPPY-Mine: Designing a Mining Reward Function

  title={HaPPY-Mine: Designing a Mining Reward Function},
  author={Lucianna Kiffer and Rajmohan Rajaraman},
  booktitle={Financial Cryptography},
In cryptocurrencies, the block reward is meant to serve as the incentive mechanism for miners to commit resources to create blocks and in effect secure the system. Existing systems primarily divide the reward in proportion to expended resources and follow one of two static models for total block reward: (i) a fixed reward for each block (e.g., Ethereum), or (ii) one where the block reward halves every set number of blocks (e.g., the Bitcoin model of halving roughly every 4 years) but otherwise… 



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