Growth and Election Outcomes in a Developing Country

  title={Growth and Election Outcomes in a Developing Country},
  author={Poonam Gmtsa Gupta and Arvind Schiff Maurice Panagariya},
  journal={Political Economy: Government Expenditures \& Related Policies eJournal},
  • P. Gupta, A. Panagariya
  • Published 1 July 2014
  • Economics
  • Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal
With the exception Brander and Drazen (2008), who use a comprehensive cross-country database consisting of both developed and developing countries, the hypothesis that rapid growth helps incumbents win elections has been tested exclusively for the developed countries (e.g., Ray Fair 1978). But since sustained rapid growth offers the prospect of pulling vast numbers of the voters out of poverty within a generation, such an effect is far more likely to be present in the developing rather than… 
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