Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

@article{Hatfield2009GroupIC,
  title={Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts},
  author={John William Hatfield and Fuhito Kojima},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2009},
  volume={67},
  pages={745-749}
}
Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95, 913-935] present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals' preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. We show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is group… CONTINUE READING

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