Corpus ID: 6900602

Group buying with bundle discounts: computing efficient, stable and fair solutions

@inproceedings{Coviello2015GroupBW,
  title={Group buying with bundle discounts: computing efficient, stable and fair solutions},
  author={Lorenzo Coviello and Yi-Ling Chen and Massimo Franceschetti},
  year={2015}
}
  • Lorenzo Coviello, Yi-Ling Chen, Massimo Franceschetti
  • Published 2015
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • We model a market in which nonstrategic vendors sell items of different types and offer bundles at discounted prices triggered by demand volumes. Each buyer acts strategically in order to maximize her utility, given by the difference between product valuation and price paid. Buyers report their valuations in terms of reserve prices on sets of items, and might be willing to pay prices different than the market price in order to subsidize other buyers and to trigger discounts. The resulting price… CONTINUE READING

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