Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective

@article{List2005GroupKA,
  title={Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective},
  author={Christian List},
  journal={Episteme},
  year={2005},
  volume={2},
  pages={25 - 38}
}
  • C. List
  • Published 1 June 2005
  • Psychology
  • Episteme
In this paper, I introduce the emerging theory of judgment aggregation as a framework for studying institutional design in social epistemology. When a group or collective organization is given an epistemic task, its performance may depend on its ‘aggregation procedure’, i.e. its mechanism for aggregating the group members' individual beliefs or judgments into corresponding collective beliefs or judgments endorsed by the group as a whole. I argue that a group's aggregation procedure plays an… 
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