• Corpus ID: 238857067

Group Identity, Social Learning and Opinion Dynamics

  title={Group Identity, Social Learning and Opinion Dynamics},
  author={Sebastiano Della Lena and Luca Paolo Merlino},
In this paper, we study opinion dynamics in a balanced social structure consisting of two groups. Agents learn the true state of the world naively learning from their neighbors and from an unbiased source of information. Agents want to agree with others of the same group—in-group identity,— but to disagree with those of the opposite group—out-group conflict. We characterize steady state opinions, and show that agents’ influence depends on their Bonacich centrality in the signed network of… 

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